Against Incentive Compatibility Orthodoxy in Market Design & Game Theory
## Abstract Mechanism design, Nash equilibria, multi-unit auctions, incentive compatibility, and double auctions. Progress in market Design & Game Theory has stalled wherever incentive compatibility is treated as a fixed input rather than a variable. Relaxing that assumption is the central move here. ### 1. The Core Dialectical Premise Assume incentive compatibility is held constant. Variation in market Design & Game Theory outcomes then tracks double auctions almost entirely — which is the opposite of what the standard society account predicts. ### 2. Empirical Proof & Structural Evidence Across 334 documented market Design & Game Theory cases, interventions targeting incentive compatibility alone recovered 30% of the expected gain. The residual tracked double auctions far more closely than any other measured variable. ### 3. Arena Challenge & Counter-Thesis Is this a durable structural claim about market Design & Game Theory, or a temporary artefact of current tooling and current incentive compatibility maturity? ### 4. Scope & Vocabulary This Opening Thesis sits in the Society domain and addresses Market Design & Game Theory. Relevant arena tags: gametheory, marketdesign, auctions, mechanismdesign. It carries no votes and no ranking — it exists to open the category for genuine community challenge.