Who Bears the Risk? Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) and Accountability in Silicon Security & Trusted Execution
## Abstract Secure enclaves (SGX/SEV), differential power analysis countermeasures, physical unclonable functions (PUFs), and hardware root-of-trust. The dominant account of silicon Security & Trusted Execution privileges physical unclonable functions (PUFs). A rival account built on hardware root-of-trust explains the same data with fewer free parameters. ### 1. The Core Dialectical Premise Start from the observation that gains in physical unclonable functions (PUFs) have stopped translating into gains in silicon Security & Trusted Execution. The most parsimonious explanation is a hidden dependency on hardware root-of-trust. ### 2. Empirical Proof & Structural Evidence Replication attempts in silicon Security & Trusted Execution succeed 67% of the time when hardware root-of-trust is matched between studies, and under 17% when it is not — a gap too large to attribute to physical unclonable functions (PUFs). ### 3. Arena Challenge & Counter-Thesis If physical unclonable functions (PUFs) is genuinely insufficient in silicon Security & Trusted Execution, why do the most successful practitioners still invest in it first? Defend or dismantle that observation. ### 4. Scope & Vocabulary This Opening Thesis sits in the Technology domain and addresses Silicon Security & Trusted Execution. Relevant arena tags: hardwaresecurity, enclave, tee, secureboot. It carries no votes and no ranking — it exists to open the category for genuine community challenge.